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Abstract—Permissioned blockchains are supported by identi-
fied but individually untrustworthy nodes, collectively maintain-
ing a replicated ledger whose content is trusted. The Hyperledger
Fabric permissioned blockchain system targets high-throughput
transaction processing. Fabric uses a set of nodes tasked with
the ordering of transactions using consensus. Additional peers
endorse and validate transactions, and maintain a copy of the
ledger. The ability to quickly disseminate new transaction blocks
from ordering nodes to all peers is critical for both performance
and consistency. Broadcast is handled by a gossip protocol, using
randomized exchanges of blocks between peers.
We show that the current implementation of gossip in Fabric
leads to heavy tail distributions of block propagation latencies,
impacting performance, consistency, and fairness. We contribute
a novel design for gossip in Fabric that simultaneously optimizes
propagation time, tail latency and bandwidth consumption. Using
a 100-node cluster, we show that our enhanced gossip allows the
dissemination of blocks to all peers more than 10 times faster than
with the original implementation, while decreasing the overall
network bandwidth consumption by more than 40%. With a
high throughput and concurrent application, this results in 17%
to 36% fewer invalidated transactions for different block sizes.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Hyperledger Fabric, Performance,
Tail latency, Broadcast, Gossip
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains have gained strong momentum in the last
decade, following the initial release of the Bitcoin cryp-
tocurrency [39]. A blockchain is an immutable, append-only
and globally replicated data structure. The content of the
blockchain evolves following the evaluation of transactions
submitted by its clients. Transactions who meet validity and
determinism criteria are eventually executed in some unique
order. Transactions are grouped into blocks, which are linked
as a chain: each new block’s header contains a cryptographic
hash of the previous block, repeatedly until the first (genesis)
block, allowing to check the consistency of the chain and that
of any of its blocks. A set of nodes support the blockchain
infrastructure. The key benefit of blockchains is that clients
do not need to trust individual nodes or any other client,
but can put their trust in the infrastructure as a whole: The
blockchain is a mutual source of agreement between otherwise
mutually untrusting participants. Blockchains enable a number
of new applications, starting from cryptocurrencies [19], [39]
and followed by supply chain management [21], healthcare
management [34] and e-voting [33].
A blockchain infrastructure is a multi-layer system that
combines several key enabling features [15]. Transactions
can be written in a domain-specific language (e.g. for fi-
nancial transactions in bitcoin [39]) or a more general lan-
guage (e.g. the Turing-complete and deterministic Solidity
in Ethereum [48] or general-purpose languages such as Go
or JavaScript in Hyperledger Fabric [2]). A runtime allows
executing transactions against the current state of the ledger
(i.e., the sequence of all validated transactions) using a specific
virtual machine [25] or container-based isolation. Crypto-
graphic primitives allow checking the validity of the blocks
and of the blockchain itself.
In addition to language, runtime and cryptography building
blocks, a blockchain relies on two key distributed protocols:
consensus and broadcast.
Consensus manages the addition of new blocks to the chain.
As individual infrastructure nodes are generally untrustworthy
and may attempt to corrupt the content of the chain or impose
ill-formed blocks, byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus is
generally necessary. In some scenarios, a crash-fault-tolerant
(CFT) consensus might be sufficient. In Open or permission-
less blockchains, exemplified by Bitcoin [39], Ethereum [48],
or Zerocash [42], any node, called a miner, may participate to
the BFT consensus and attempt to append new blocks to the
chain. There is no management of identities, and therefore the
BFT consensus protocol must be resilient to sybil attacks [16].
Permissioned blockchains, on the other hand, assume the
existence of a trusted membership management service, and
that nodes participating to the infrastructure are all certified
by this authority. This allows the use of classical byzantine
fault-tolerant consensus algorithms that assume identifiable
participants, called orderers, such as PBFT [11], Zyzzyva [32],
or BFT-Smart [7], or CFT protocols such as primary-backup
replication [22], [26]. Examples of permissioned blockchains
are Hyperledger Fabric [2], Tendermint [10] and Corda [24].
The broadcast primitive is used at multiple levels of a
blockchain and is fundamental for both performance and relia-
bility. It propagates transactions from clients to miners in open
blockchains, and new blocks from miners or orderers to all
other nodes. Since blockchains can be supported by hundreds
of nodes, the direct sending of a block from its source to all
other nodes is not a valid option. Furthermore, blockchains
are expected to work under challenging conditions such as
churn, packet loss, and lack of synchronicity. Deterministic
algorithms perform poorly and do not scale well under such
conditions, thus robust broadcast in blockchains relies on the
use of randomized gossip protocols [8], [13]. Gossip spreads
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Fig. 1. Fabric deployed over three organizations.
information through probabilistic exchanges between nodes,
similar to the spread of an epidemic.
Motivation and contributions. While the performance and
scalability of byzantine fault-tolerant consensus in blockchains
have received significant attention, the performance and scala-
bility of broadcast, and its impact on the overall performance
and reliability of a blockchain, has received little attention. The
objective of this work is to close this gap, with an emphasis
on permissioned blockchains. We analyze the performance and
impact on reliability and consistency of gossip-based broadcast
in Hyperledger Fabric [2], and propose, implement and test
protocol modifications to reduce this impact. Our experimental
validation using a 100-node cluster shows that our enhanced
gossip module allows the dissemination of blocks to all peers
more than 10 times faster than with the original imple-
mentation, while decreasing the overall network bandwidth
consumption by more than 40%. This results in 17% to 36%
fewer invalidated transactions at validation time, depending
on the block generation period. Remaining conflicts are a
result of the delay of consensus and validation, henceforth our
enhanced gossip module essentially eliminates most conflicts
resulting from inefficient or unfair dissemination. Our code
is released as open source and available at https://github.com/
berendeanicolae/fabric/tree/fair-and-efficient-gossip.
II. THE ANATOMY OF HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
Hyperledger is a collection of open-source blockchain
projects initiated in December 2015 by the Linux foundation
and supported by several key industrial players. Fabric [2] is
a permissioned blockchain system part of Hyperledger. In this
section we first present the architecture and components of
Fabric. We then explain how Fabric processes client trans-
actions, and discuss how its consistency model can result in
conflicts and discarded transactions. Note that the gossip-based
broadcast of Fabric, as well as its impact on consistency, are
at the core of this work and detailed in Section III.
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Fig. 2. Timeline of a transaction preparation and execution in Fabric, with
the subsequent gossip-based broadcast and validation of a new block.
A. Fabric architecture
The architecture of Fabric is illustrated in Figure 1. Fab-
ric supports smart contracts named chaincodes submitted by
clients and executed against the content of the ledger. Chain-
codes can be written in general-purpose languages such as
node.js or Go. As for other blockchains, a chaincode must be
deterministic: for a given input set, the set of written values
should be unique across executions. This property enables
the execution and validation of the chaincode on multiple,
mutually untrusted nodes. The Fabric execution model is not
linked to a cryptocurrency.
Fabric assumes the existence of a trusted membership
service provider (MSP) that uniquely certifies the identity of
infrastructure nodes composed of orderers and peers. Fabric
partitions the introduction of new blocks to the chain, which
is handled by orderers, from the validation and execution of
chaincodes, handled by peers. This partition enables orderers
to use pluggable consensus protocols such as a crash fault-
tolerant service based on Apache Kafka [22], or a byzantine-
fault tolerant service using BFT-Smart [7], [45].
Fabric adopts an execute-order-validate (EOV) model for
transaction handling and execution by peers, who all maintain
a complete copy of the ledger. A subset of peers called
endorsers first performs an initial execution (called simulation)
of chaincodes. The client collects endorsements and combines
them into a transaction proposal. Proposals are submitted to
the orderers, who append them to a block, eventually added to
the blockchain as a result of the consensus operation. Every
new block is then broadcast to all peers where it is locally
validated. The output of valid transactions is then integrated
into the local copies of the ledger. Note that this EOV model is
in contrast with all open blockchains, for which all transactions
are executed on all peers to form tentative blocks, and for
which all peers participate to the consensus, leading to an
essentially sequential execution model.
B. Execution of a transaction in Fabric
We detail the lifetime of a transaction in Fabric, from the
submission of a chaincode by a client to the execution of
the resulting transaction on the blockchain. Fabric supports
multiple channels (independent ledgers) and deployment over
multiple organizations, as exemplified by Figure 1. In the
remainder of this work, we consider a deployment with a
unique blockchain (channel).
Figure 2 details the timeline of transaction preparation
and processing. A client submits her chaincode to a set of
peers that simulate the transaction and act as endorsers. Their
number and origin are dictated by an endorsement policy. For
instance, three peers may receive the transaction and simulate
the chaincode independently. The set of values in the chain,
result of the execution of all valid transactions, is materialized
locally in a key/value store and used as input to the simulated
chaincode. Values are associated with a version number. The
read set of a simulated transaction contains the version number
of all accessed keys. The chaincode runs isolated in a Docker
container and produces a set of new values for a number
of keys, forming its write set. Non-deterministic chaincodes
produce different read and/or write sets, which can be detected
by the client. The read and write sets are compiled in an
endorsement signed by the endorser and returned to the client.
The client combines the received endorsements into a trans-
action proposal. This proposal is sent to a peer, who forwards
it to the ordering service. The transaction is kept in a buffer
to be eventually integrated into a new block. Orderers do not
perform any validation on transaction proposals. A new block
is proposed for consensus when its size reaches a maximal
size, or after a timer expires. Example values in Fabric v1.2
are 99 MB and 2 seconds but must be adjusted for the target
applications.
Consensus outputs chained blocks in a unique order. A
new block must be propagated to all peers to allow future
transactions to operate on the new values. Orderers send a
new block to one peer in each organization. This leader peer
is in charge of initiating the broadcast of the block to all
peers in its organization. Using a direct-send approach for
this broadcast is not scalable since both the dissemination
time and bandwidth usage of the leader peer increase linearly
with the size of the organization. Any organization with more
than a handful of peers will, therefore, resort to gossip-based
broadcast protocols. We detail how gossip is implemented in
Fabric in Section III.
A peer receiving a new block validates all the transaction
proposals it contains. A proposal is valid if the number and
origin of its endorsements satisfy the endorsement policy. In
addition, it must operate on the latest values present in the
ledger. This can be checked based on the read set of the
proposal, where the version of all keys must be the same as
the version in the local key/value store. The output of all valid
transactions is applied to the key/value store and the block
appended to the local copy of the chain (without re-executing
the chaincodes). Invalid transactions remain in the blockchain
but have no effect besides wasted storage space.
C. Consistency of Fabric
Even though the Fabric orderers define a total order on the
submitted transactions, and peers eventually agree on the same
replica of the ledger, consistency conflicts can arise in the
interim, leading to invalidated transactions and lower quality
of service for the clients who must prepare and resubmit
new transaction proposals. Without proper safeguards, this can
cause problems at the application level such as an invalid
trade in a digital marketplace. We differentiate two types of
conflicts: proposal-time and validation-time conflicts.
Proposal-time conflicts can happen when two or more
endorsers execute the transaction over different heights of the
ledger because they did not yet receive the same set of blocks.
Even if the chaincode is deterministic, its results can differ if
one of the endorsers has not yet seen a recent write. This
conflict can be detected at the client by comparing version
numbers in the read sets, but it wastes resources and causes
delays as the client must collect additional endorsements.
Validation-time conflicts can occur when two transactions
issue writes to a common value without being aware of each
other’s execution. This happens when two chaincodes access
at least one key in common and are executed over the same
content of the ledger. These conflicting proposals may be
ordered in different blocks, or at different places within the
same block. This can cause conflicting writes characteristic of
weakly consistent systems. In Fabric the total order imposed
by the ledger allows a natural earliest-writer-wins conflict
resolution policy. The first transaction is deemed valid and
its output applied to the local copy at validation, whereas the
second transaction will fail the validation check.
Validation time conflicts have a higher impact than proposal-
time conflicts. First, the client submitting a transaction only
learns that it has lost the race with another transaction after
its invalidation, which causes a long delay before a new
transaction proposal can be prepared and resubmitted. Second,
it creates useless, invalid entries in the ledger, consuming
valuable storage resources at all peers.
Both types of conflicts occur because endorsers simulate
transactions without synchronization on their state. This is a
conscious design choice led by trust assumptions. Consistency
issues are mentioned by the authors of the paper detailing
Fabric [2]. They mention that careful application design (i.e.,
avoiding chaincodes that write to the same value) can avoid
conflicts, but it is unclear how to enforce such a strong
constraint with mutually distrustful organizations. Another
suggested approach is to use conflict-free replicated data types
(CRDTs) [44], allowing concurrent writes to deterministically
merge into a single value but restricting the programming
model significantly. A third approach would be to use a lead
endorser for each chaincode acting as a serialization point for
all its executions. This approach may avoid conflicts between
instances of the same chaincode. It is however costly and will
have no impact for different chaincodes that need to access
and write the same values.
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Fig. 3. Dissemination of a new block in Fabric, with fout = 2 and fin = 1.
III. GOSSIP BROADCAST IN FABRIC
A. Gossip broadcast in Fabric
We detail in this section how epidemic/gossip-based broad-
cast is currently implemented in Fabric1. Fabric uses gossip
for many purposes [37]: peers use it to build and maintain
a local view of other peers in the network; they also use it
when joining the network for the first time or after a crash.
Gossip is used to disseminate metadata such as ledger height
and active chaincodes. Finally, gossip is primarily used to
disseminate new blocks to all peers within an organization,
who then independently validate their content and apply the
results of valid transactions to their local copy of the ledger.
In this work we focus on the gossip-based dissemination of
data blocks from the ordering service to the peers. We mention
that gossip is optional in this setting, and for trust reasons only
allowed between peers of the same organization. We assume,
therefore, that we operate in an environment with at least one
large enough organization for which a direct broadcast from
the leader peer to all other peers would have a prohibitive cost.
Figure 3 illustrates the propagation of a block within an
organization. The ordering service first sends a copy of a new
block to the leader peer, who initiates the gossip broadcast
to the other peers in the organization. The gossip protocol
operates on a complete graph since all peers know the identity
of all other peers within the organization. Fabric combines
three dissemination primitives: push, pull and recovery.2
Push: Fabric uses an infect-and-die push model [18]. When-
ever a peer receives a block for the first time (it gets infected),
it pushes the block once to fout peers chosen at random, but
does not push again if it subsequently receives the same block
1https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-1.2/gossip.html
provides high-level details about the objectives and implementation of gossip
in Fabric.
2Note that recovery is sometimes called anti-entropy in Fabric documenta-
tion and in developers’ communication. This creates a confusion as the term
was originally used to denote pull in early work on gossip dissemination [13].
We favor the more explicit term to avoid this confusion.
(it pushes, then dies). More technically, the new block is
first put in a buffer, and pushed when the buffer is full or
a short timer tpush expires. Figure 3 shows a push phase with
fout = 2. The default configuration of Fabric uses fout = 3 and
tpush = 10 milliseconds. Some peers receive a block multiple
times during the push phase (e.g. P1, P2, P3 and P6), whereas
other peers do not receive it (e.g. P5 and P8).
Pull: Peers use the pull component to obtain the blocks
they did not receive during the push phase. At every time
interval tpull, every peer initiates a pull to fin peers chosen
at random. If fin = 3 and peer P contacts peers Q,R, S, it
first requests the digests of recent blocks from Q,R, S, which
they will forward back to P . From all the received digests, P
then requests the blocks from Q,R, S that it does not already
have, which are finally forwarded to P . Note that when a
peer receives a new data block from a pull request, it will
not directly push this block to other peers, but will only reply
to pull requests. The default parameters of the Fabric pull
component are fin = 3 and tpull = 4 seconds. We use fin = 1
in Figure 3 and only show pull interactions for P5 and P8
in the interest of clarity. Pull can lead to high latencies for
some peers, as it is initiated infrequently. For instance, peer
P5 only receives the new block on its second pull attempt,
from peer P2.
Recovery: The recovery gossip component of Fabric allows
peers to catch up with the content of the ledger by asking
for a batch of missing blocks, either when they join the
network, or after a long delay due to an outage, high latency
or any other cause. At every time interval trecovery, each peer
observes the metadata information containing the ledger height
of the other peers in the channel. As opposed to the push
and pull components, this is not limited to peers in the same
organization. If a peer is behind the others, it requests the
consecutive missing blocks from one of the peers with the
highest ledger. The default parameter of the Fabric recovery
component is trecovery = 10 seconds. In practice, recovery has
no impact on the propagation latencies in a stable network.
B. Impact of gossip on bandwidth and conflicts
The performance of broadcast plays a direct role in the
occurrence of inconsistencies in Fabric: long propagation
times between orderers and peers can cause validation-time
conflicts, and proposal-time conflicts are a direct consequence
of uneven propagation times between orderers and peers. In
large organizations resorting to gossip to broadcast ordered
blocks, the default delays induced by the pull and recovery
components (4 seconds and 10 seconds) are larger than the
timer before a block is proposed for consensus (2 seconds).
In other words, a large subset of conflicts is intrinsically
caused by the broadcast tail latency, i.e., the tail of the latency
distribution corresponding to the time required for a peer to
receive a new block after its addition by the ordering service. It
is therefore desirable to have a broadcast protocol that is as fast
as possible in delivering new blocks to all peers for Fabric to
scale without a massive increase in the occurrence of conflicts.
Similar observations have been made for eventually-consistent
key-value stores in the cloud [6].
The gossip layer also has a big impact on the bandwidth
consumption of the Fabric peers. With large blocks and high
throughput, the bandwidth of data blocks dominates, which
can create contention and load-balancing issues, inducing
additional delays and higher operating costs. The objective of
this work is thus to analyze and optimize the broadcast layer
of Fabric, with a focus on efficiency, fairness, and cost.
IV. ENHANCED EPIDEMIC DISSEMINATION
The literature on epidemic dissemination, both theoretical
and practical, is vast, and gossip protocols were proposed for
a wide variety of problems such as replicated database mainte-
nance [13], propagation [5], membership [29], streaming [20],
total ordering [38], and many distributed signal processing
tasks [14]. However, there is little work that simultaneously
targets practical applications supported by precise theoreti-
cal guarantees. On the one hand, theoretical work generally
assumes that the communication takes place in synchronous
rounds and that the cost of establishing the communication
between peers is free, and provides asymptotic results for
large deployments that disregard costly multiplicative con-
stants [30]. On the other hand, practical work is generally
empirical and does not estimate the probability of imperfect
dissemination.
The main advantage of the Fabric gossip module, highly
practical, is its modularity: the push, pull and recovery com-
ponents are fully decoupled. This allows to push fast and to
pull infrequently.
The infect-and-die push component of Fabric has two main
disadvantages: its high communication overhead and its low
probability of disseminating blocks to all peers. For instance,
in our experiments with a network of n = 100 peers and fout =
3, we can easily calculate that infect-and-die push disseminates
each block to an average of 94 peers with a standard deviation
of 2.6, while transmitting each block in full 282 times. The
uninformed peers at the end of the push phase must resort
to the infrequent pull or recovery components to receive a
block, inducing a high latency. Reaching all peers during the
push phase with high probability3 requires a large fout, which
causes load-balancing and contention problems, and requires
transmitting the block n · fout times.
We now describe the enhancements we made to the Fabric
gossip module, summarized in Table I.
Infect-upon-contagion push dissemination: We replace the
infect-and-die push component by an infect-upon-contagion
push algorithm [31]. In this model, peers forward blocks
at every round during which they receive them. The main
advantage of the infect-upon-contagion push over the well-
known infect-forever model [17] is its load balancing, as it
does not impose an undue burden onto the peer initiating the
rumor. Our protocol requires a stopping condition: we attach a
counter r to each block, initialized at 0. When a peer receives
3With high probability means with probability O(n−c) for some c > 0.
a block b with counter r = k (the exact pair (b, k)) for the
first time, it increments its counter to k + 1 and forwards b
to a sample of fout other peers chosen uniformly at random.
The dissemination stops when the counters of the blocks being
disseminated locally reach an agreed-upon time-to-live TTL
value. Note that the notion of rounds, even asynchronous, is
unnecessary in this setting.
The probability of imperfect dissemination pe, i.e., the
probability that a block does not reach all peers during the
push phase, depends on n, fout and TTL. We can calculate pe
very precisely. Our analysis is summarized in the appendix.
We target pe = 10−6 for a network of n = 100 peers in our
experiments. We consider two configurations achieving this
goal: (1) fout = blnnc = 4 and TTL = 9; and (2) fout = 2
and TTL = 19. If pe = 10−6 is insufficient, increasing TTL
from 9 to 12 with fout = 4 leads to pe = 10−12, which
is in all likelihood smaller than the probability of hardware
crash for a given peer. Despite these seemingly high TTL
values, the absence of predetermined rounds makes this phase
significantly faster than the frequency of the pull and recovery
components. Note also that TTL varies slowly with n; we can,
therefore, store a small number of TTL values for (n, pe) pairs
in a lookup table. Peers can adjust TTL using the lowest upper
bound for the number of peers appearing in the table.
We also remove the tpush = 10ms timer for data blocks
embedded in Fabric, not to improve the latency but to ensure
unbiased randomness. More precisely, the timer causes bias
because peers receiving a block b with different counter values
during a 10ms interval put them in the same buffer and
transmit them to the same fout peers, reducing the number
of messages, which increases the probability of imperfect dis-
semination pe above the theoretical guarantees. The simplest
way to solve this problem is to set tpush = 0 for data blocks,
ensuring that each pair (b, k) is forwarded to a random sample
of fout peers.
Digests for the push phase: As we increase TTL, at the end
of the dissemination, most if not all peers are already informed
and keep sending the same blocks to each other. This results in
an unacceptable communication overhead. We thus introduce
digests for the push phase, as done for many existing push
protocols. When a peer receives a block whose counter r is
below TTL, it first selects a sample of fout peers at random
and sends them a digest of the block. The peers who do not
already have the block will request it, and the block will then
be pushed to them. We can further improve this by pushing
without digest until TTLdirect while there are little collisions,
and push with a digest until TTL. With n = 100 and fout = 4,
we can set TTLdirect = 2. In our experiments on a LAN, this
feature has shown little effect on latency and can be omitted.
The number of messages per block sent by our push protocol
is k lnn where k is a large constant. This is unavoidable to
reach all peers with high probability without using pull. With
a digest, we ensure that large blocks are only transmitted
n+ o(n) times, with the other messages being small digests.
With push-pull algorithms, Θ(n lnn lnn) messages are op-
Enhancement Description Benefit
Infect-upon-contagion
push dissemination
Peers forward blocks at every round during which they
receive them.
Better load balancing and better control over the number of
outgoing messages for each peer.
Digests for the push
phase
Peers forward a digest of the blocks they receive instead of
the entire block.
Remove communication overhead caused by receiving the
same full block multiple times.
Randomization of the
initial gossiper
Leader peers initiate gossip by sending the block to an
initial peer, who initiates the dissemination to f leaderout peers.
Reduce the burden on leader peers and increase fairness.
Removal of the pull
component Deactivate the pull component.
Avoid overhead caused by the now-unnecessary pull
component.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE ENHANCEMENTS TO THE FABRIC GOSSIP LAYER.
timal [30], but this assumes that peers know when blocks
arrive in the network, and that establishing the communication
between peers is free. Without these unrealistic and impractical
assumptions, a large time between rounds must be respected.
Our protocol is, therefore, orders of magnitude faster than this
variant.
Randomization of the initial gossiper: In Fabric, the leader
peer, who receives all the blocks from the ordering service,
always initiates the dissemination. Its downstream bandwidth
is thus fout times higher than that of regular peers. To alleviate
this burden, we fix f leaderout = 1. On expectation, this splits the
beginning of the gossip phase evenly among the other network
peers.
Removal of the pull component: By setting the probability of
imperfect dissemination low enough, the pull component loses
its usefulness, thus we get rid of it. In the unlikely occurrence
that a peer fails to receive a block at the end of the push phase,
it will be fetched during recovery. The recovery component
serves other fundamental needs such as recovery after crashes
and we keep it as it is.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate our improved Fabric gossip module and com-
pare it to the original version. Our evaluation focuses on three
criteria: latency of block dissemination, the impact of latency
on consistency conflicts, and bandwidth consumption.
A. Experiment setup
We use version 1.2 of Fabric. We set up a network of 100
peers belonging to a single organization, one client, and a
CFT ordering service consisting of four Kafka [22] nodes
and three Zookeeper [26] nodes, corresponding to the default
configuration for a Kafka-based setup. All nodes are deployed
on a cluster of 15 servers equipped with 8-core L5420 Intel®
Xeon® CPUs at 2.5 GHz and 8 GB of RAM, interconnected
using 1 Gbps Ethernet. All components run inside Docker
containers on at least one dedicated core.
In our first set of experiments, we use a chaincode from
the Fabric high-throughput network example that models n
cryptocurrency asset whose value is frequently modified [1].
We use the following configuration for orderers: blocks contain
at most 50 transactions, with a timeout of 2 seconds if less than
50 transactions are received. During every test, we sequentially
initiate 50,000 transactions so that a full block containing
50 transactions is created every ≈ 1.5 second. This results
in 1,000 blocks of ≈ 160 KB per block.
B. Evaluation baseline (original Fabric gossip module)
For comparison purposes, we initially test the original
gossip module of Fabric, without any modification, using
the experimental setup described above. We use the default
parameters for the push, pull and recovery components: the
push component uses fout = 3 and a timer of tpush = 10 ms,
the pull component uses fin = 3 and is executed by each
peer every tpull = 4 seconds, and peers execute the recovery
component every trecovery = 10 seconds.
Figure 4 first illustrates the latency at the peer level by
showing how much time peers take to receive blocks starting
from the beginning of their dissemination (i.e. their reception
by the contact peer from the orderer nodes). It includes three
CDFs for peers with the slowest, median and fastest average
latencies. Figure 5 then illustrates the latency at the block level
by showing how fast given blocks reach each network peer.
We include three CDFs for the slowest, median and fastest
disseminated blocks. Figures 4 and 5 are probability plots with
a logarithmic scale based on a logistic distribution, for two
reasons. First, this allows focusing on tail latencies. Second,
most push dissemination protocols grow like a logistic function
(i.e., exponentially at the beginning of the dissemination,
followed by slower growth to inform the last uninformed
processes), as we observe by the linear fit on the left side
of the figures. The fat and long tail is obvious in both figures,
and corresponds to the transition from the fast push phase, to
the much slower pull phase.
Figure 6 shows the bandwidth consumption for the leader
peer and another peer chosen at random (all the non-leader
peers behave similarly). Note that for readability purposes we
aggregated the bandwidth for each interval of 10 seconds, thus
the highest traffic spikes of ≈ 4 MB/s do not appear on the
figure. The generation of transactions ends after ≈1,500 sec-
onds. The figure also shows the 0.4 MB/s background traffic
of all the tasks when the network is in an idle state from 1,500
to 2,000 seconds, illustrating the relevance of optimizing the
bandwidth requirements of the epidemic dissemination. The
main difference between the leader peer and the other peers
is that the leader peer receives every block from the ordering
service once and disseminates it to fout other peers, whereas
the other peers do not always do this because the infect-and-die
push phase for some of the blocks terminates without reaching
them.
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Fig. 4. Latency at the peer level using the original gossip module of Fabric.
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Fig. 5. Latency at the block level using the original gossip module of Fabric.
C. Evaluation of our enhanced Fabric gossip module
We now test the performance of our enhanced Fabric gossip
module and compare it to the original baseline. We select the
parameters to obtain a probability of imperfect dissemination
of 10−6 in an organization of n = 100 peers, that is, the
probability that a block does not reach all the peers during the
push phase and requires the recovery component is at most
10−6. As discussed in Section IV, we emphasize once more
that TTL can be calculated precisely for any n, and since it
varies slowly with n a few values can be stored in a lookup
table. We first set f leaderout = 1 to decrease the bandwidth burden
on the leader peer. The peer who receives the block from the
leader peer initiates the gossip. We also remove the pull phase
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Fig. 6. Bandwidth consumption for the leader peer and a regular peer using
the original gossip module of Fabric. For readability purposes the bandwidth
is aggregated at intervals of 10 seconds. Dotted lines show the average
bandwidth.
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Fig. 7. Latency at the peer level using the enhanced gossip module of Fabric
with fout = 4 and TTL = 9.
entirely due to its redundancy with the recovery component.
We finally set tpush = 0 for data blocks. Surprisingly, removing
this counter has a detrimental effect on the average end-to-
end latency, however as discussed in Section IV this is the
simplest way to ensure unbiased randomness, leading to the
theoretical dissemination guarantees of our protocol, without
further modification to the Fabric codebase.
We note that due to the chosen parameters, none of our
experiments had to resort to the recovery component at any
point, besides when it was triggered in the middle of a push
phase. It was, for dissemination purposes, never required, but
would have been at some point had we experimented with
millions of blocks.
In a first evaluation, we set fout = blog nc = 4 and TTL =
9. We further set TTLdirect = 2 because collisions are rare
enough in the first two rounds to avoid sending digests. As
done for the baseline, Figures 7, 8 and 9 respectively show the
latency at the peer level, the latency at the block level, and the
bandwidth consumption for the leader peer and other peers.
While the original configuration of Fabric requires between
one and six seconds to reach the last 5% of the peers, the
enhanced gossip module disseminates all the blocks to all the
peers in less than half a second. Note that the curves in Figures
7 and 8 are almost linear, which we expect from probability
plots with a logarithmic scale based on a logistic distribution.
The gentler slope to reach the last 5% of the peers/blocks is not
due to the theoretically expected propagation of the epidemic
dissemination but to other sources of delay. For example, the
yellow curve on the right side of Figure 8 corresponds to the
slowest block in this experiment. We observe that this block
took ≈ 0.15 second to reach the peer initiating the broadcast,
due to a delay at the leader peer.
As for the bandwidth, we observe comparing Figures 6
and 9 that the enhanced module decreases the bandwidth
consumption of regular peers by more than 40%; the total
network bandwidth consumption also decreases by 40%. We
emphasize that the difference will be even more significant
with larger blocks, since their dissemination dwarfs the back-
ground bandwidth of all the other system tasks.
Note that setting f leaderout = 1 for the leader peer and
adding digests are not useless luxuries. Figure 10 reports the
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Fig. 8. Latency at the block level using the enhanced gossip module of Fabric
with fout = 4 and TTL = 9.
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Fig. 9. Bandwidth consumption for the leader peer and a regular peer using
the enhanced gossip module of Fabric with fout = 4 and TTL = 9. For
readability purposes the bandwidth is aggregated at intervals of 10 seconds.
Dotted lines show the average bandwidth.
bandwidth usage of the same evaluation, with the exception
that the leader peer uses f leaderout = fout = 4 like the other
nodes. We observe that the bandwidth consumption of the
leader peer in this scenario is much higher than that of other
peers, which could cause contention issues with large blocks
and/or high-throughput applications. This is easy to explain:
on expectation, random peers receive and transmit each block
once, whereas the leader peer propagates every block to
fout peers. It is preferable to delegate this initial broadcast
phase uniformly at random among the 99 other peers. Worse,
Figure 11 reports the bandwidth of the same evaluation when
peers systematically push blocks without digests, which jumps
to 8 MB/s. Once more than nlogn peers are informed after the
first three rounds, the number of collisions increases quickly
to reach the point that peers already informed keep exchanging
the same blocks between each other.
In a second evaluation, we set fout = 2 and TTL = 19,
which also guarantees that a block is disseminated to every
peer during the push phase with probability at least 1− 10−6.
We can use TTLdirect = 3 in this setting. Once again,
Figures 12, 13 and 14 respectively show the latency at the
peer level, the latency at the block level, and the bandwidth
consumption for the leader peer and other peers. We observe
by comparing Figures 9 and 14 that the average and overall
bandwidth consumption remains essentially unchanged. This
is not surprising since the total number of transmitted digests
depends on the probability of imperfect dissemination, fixed
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Fig. 10. Bandwidth consumption for the leader peer and a regular peer using
the enhanced gossip module of Fabric with f leaderout = fout = 4 and TTL =
9. For readability purposes the bandwidth is aggregated at intervals of 10
seconds. Dotted lines show the average bandwidth.
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Fig. 11. Bandwidth consumption for the leader peer and a regular peer using
the enhanced gossip module of Fabric, but without sending digests before
pushing blocks to other peers with fout = 4 and TTL = 9. For readability
purposes the bandwidth is aggregated at intervals of 10 seconds. Dotted lines
show the average bandwidth.
at 10−6 in both evaluations. We also observe that decreasing
fout from 4 to 2 halves the slope of the curves in Figure 12
compared to Figure 7, which is again expected. The interesting
observation, however, is that the tails and worst-case latencies
of both experiments are rather similar. This means that fout = 4
is an aggressive choice: while it speeds up the early stages of
the dissemination, it stops being the dominant source of delay
for the slowest blocks and peers. With a more uniform load
balancing, fout = 2 is a good choice for our network.
D. Impact on Fabric consistency conflicts
We finally evaluate the impact of broadcast performance
on the occurrence of consistency conflicts. We focus on
validation-time conflicts and therefore use a single endorsing
peer. We vary the timer for the generation of new blocks, while
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Fig. 12. Latency at the peer level using the enhanced gossip module of Fabric
with fout = 2 and TTL = 19.
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Fig. 13. Latency at the block level using the enhanced gossip module of
Fabric with fout = 2 and TTL = 19.
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Fig. 14. Bandwidth consumption for the leader peer and a regular peer using
the enhanced gossip module of Fabric with fout = 2 and TTL = 19. For
readability purposes the bandwidth is aggregated at intervals of 10 seconds.
Dotted lines show the average bandwidth.
issuing a fixed rate of five transactions per second. New blocks
are only used by peers after their validation, which takes a time
proportional to the number of transactions per block, about
50 ms per transaction in our evaluation. Small block generation
periods and therefore smaller blocks validation times put
more emphasis on the impact of dissemination latency on the
occurrence of conflicts. We compare the amount of consistency
errors between the original Fabric gossip module, and our
enhanced gossip module using fout = 4 and TTL = 9.
We set up an experiment with a simple chaincode that
increments one of 100 integer values initialized to 0, and
stored in the ledger. Each integer is incremented 100 times.
We use a random permutation of the order of increments
between each round of increments. This results in a total of
10,000 transactions. Incrementing an integer requires reading
its current value. Two increments based on the same base
value will lead to a validation-time conflict. We do not resend
conflicted transactions; the difference between 10,000 and the
sum over all counters in the final ledger gives the number of
Block Validation Conflicts w/ different gossip
period Tx/block time Original Enhanced Difference
2 s 10 0.5 s 803 664 -17%
1.5 s 8-9 0.37 s 814 653 -20%
1 s 5-6 0.25 s 763 564 -26%
0.75 s 4-5 0.19 s 823 527 -36%
TABLE II
INVALIDATED TRANSACTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT BLOCK PERIODS. EACH
VALUE IS THE AVERAGE OVER FIVE EXPERIMENTS.
validation-time conflicts. Table II presents our results for timer
values varying from 0.75 s to 2 s. Each entry in the table is
the average number of conflicts over five experiments.
The number of conflicts when using the original gossip
module ranges from 763 to 823 on average. Somehow surpris-
ingly, we observe that the number of conflicts is essentially
stable with the generation period. The reason is that while
broadcast takes a few hundred milliseconds to disseminate a
block to 95% of the peers, it takes several seconds to reach the
slowest 5% peers (Figure 5). This tail dissemination latency
dominates the ordering and validation times, no matter what
block period we use.
Our enhanced gossip module, with its small average and
worst-case dissemination delays (Figure 8), significantly im-
proves upon the original Fabric gossip. As shown in Table II,
the average number of conflicts decreases with the block
period, to 664 with a period of 2 s, and down to 527 for
a block period of 0.75 s. This corresponds to reductions in the
number of invalidated transactions varying from 17% to 36%
compared to the original Fabric implementation.
VI. RELATED WORK
Although the analysis and optimization of the native Fabric
implementation is getting a lot of attention, little of it focuses
on the gossip layer or block propagation. The only work
we are aware of in this direction is a poster presentation by
Barger et al. [4], who discuss early work on the BlockStorm
epidemic protocol for Fabric. The objective of BlockStorm is
to resist the impact of adversarial peers during the broadcast.
FairLedger, proposed by Lev-Ari et al. [36], introduces a
permissioned BFT blockchain protocol tested on Hyperledger
Iroha, an alternative framework to Fabric, targeting fairness
in terms of opportunity for participants to append their trans-
actions to the ledger. The core of the protocol is again fo-
cused on an adversarial-resistant broadcast, able to detect peer
misbehavior such as withholding messages. These solutions
represent a complementary line of work that we intend to
explore if Fabric extends gossip to work across organizations.
The throughput and latency of Fabric were evaluated in
multiple studies. Sukhwani et al. [46] model the performance
of Fabric using stochastic Petri nets. They show that larger
blocks improve throughput by reducing the bottleneck at
the ordering service, at the price of higher latency. Baliga
et al. [3] propose micro-benchmarks to measure the transaction
throughput and latency of Fabric in various scenarios. Thakkar
et al. [47] propose optimization to the endorsement phase
using caching and parallelization, while Javaid et al [28]
propose optimizations to the validation phase of Fabric. Kwon
and Yu [35] also evaluate the performance of the ordering and
endorsement phases in Fabric. None of the work referred in
this paragraph was tested with a large enough number of peers
for broadcast gossip to play a significant role on fairness or
throughput.
Other works compare the performance of different versions
of Fabric, and compare Fabric with other blockchain frame-
works. A comparison between Fabric (v0.6 and v1.0) and
Ripple [43] is presented by Han et al. [23]. It focuses on the
impact of the BFT consensus. The authors’ conclusion is that
Byzantine consensus does not scale well for large blockchain
deployments, although Fabric reaches a better throughput than
Ripple. A limited comparison between Fabric and a private
deployment of Ethereum using a single blockchain node is
proposed by Pongnumkul et al. [41]. The authors conclude that
under this basic setup Fabric performs better, both in terms of
throughput and latency. A comparison between the native Fab-
ric implementation and an architecture that integrates trusted
chaincode execution using Intel SGX enclaves is presented by
Brandenburger et al. [9]. The use of enclaves incurs a small
reduction in throughput and a small latency increase.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we enhanced the Fabric gossip layer. By
decreasing its latency, we decrease the number of invalidated
transactions in high throughput and concurrent applications.
Our enhanced protocol also comes with a significant reduction
of the overall network bandwidth consumption. We suggest
three avenues for further improvements.
Fabric does not currently allow to broadcast data blocks
between peers in different organizations. This is due to access
control rules: one can evict an organization by removing it
from a channel at any time, and the permission to send a
block to an outside organization tightly depends on these
rules. Solving this problem requires some bookkeeping, but
the development community around Fabric is considering to
enable it in a future release. This would certainly be a nice
feature as Fabric scales since the good properties of epidemic
algorithms shine as the number of peers increases due to the
law of large numbers.
On the theoretical side, we did not consider adversarial
peers trying, for instance, to hinder the dissemination by
purposefully dropping blocks received from other peers. Al-
though gossip epidemic dissemination is obviously better than
deterministic protocols in this setting, a formal analysis of the
impact of adversarial peers and possible countermeasures is
warranted.
The use of a stream of transactions instead of blocks, as
proposed with StreamChain [27], could reduce the latency
of the ordering drastically, and put a stronger emphasis on
the impact of gossip. We keep the evaluation of enhanced
gossip under this setting for future work, once StreamChain
is integrated into Fabric.
We finally intend to expand the study of gossip and its
impact on consistency, fairness and performance to other
blockchains, both permissioned (e.g. Sawtooth [40]) and open
(e.g. Ethereum [48]).
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APPENDIX
We briefly summarize how to derive the time-to-live TTL
required for our infect-upon-contagion push phase to dissem-
inate a block to all peers with probability 1− pe in a network
of n peers using a fan-out of fout.
Let Xr be the number of peers that receive at least
one push digest during round r, and let ϕ(x) ,
n
(
1− (1− 1n)fout·x). Since ϕ is a concave function, it
follows from Jensen’s inequality that E[Xr+1] ≤ ϕ (E[Xr]) =
n
(
1− (1− 1n)fout·E[Xr]). Applying ϕ recursively we ob-
tain ϕ (E[Xr]) ≤ ϕ(ϕ(E[Xr−1])) ≤ · · · ≤ ϕr+1(E[X0])
where E[X0] = 1 and ϕr+1(x) = ϕ(ϕr(x)). We de-
fine ψ : N → R recursively by ψ(0) = 1 and ψ(r +
1) , ϕ(ψ(r)) = n
(
1− (1− 1n)fout·ψ(r)). It follows that
E[Xr+1] = E[ϕ(Xr)] ≤ ψ(r+1). ψ(r) converges to a limit γ
called carrying capacity, because it is monotonically increas-
ing and bounded above by n. A solution for γ is given by
Corless et al. [12] with the principal branch of the Lambert-W
function γ = n fout+W (−foute
−fout )
fout
where W (x) is the largest
solution of x = WeW . Let X be the population size at time
t and consider the differential equation dXdt = κX ·
(
1− Xγ
)
where κ is the growth rate. Solving this differential equation
for X yields X(t) = γX0e
κt
γ+X0(eκt−1) where X0 = X(0) = 1 and
lim
t→∞X(t) = γ. Since we want to compare X(t) with ψ(t),
we choose κ such that eκ = fout, yielding X(t) =
γftout
γ+ftout−1 .
We can prove that ψ(r) ≥ X(r) when fout ≥ 2 (we omit
the proof due to lack of space). Let m ,
r−1∑
i=0
fout · E[Xi] be
the expected number of push digests transmitted during r > 1
rounds. It follows that m ≈ fout
r−1∑
i=0
ψ(i) ≥ fout
r−1∑
i=0
X(i) ≥
fout
∫ r−1
0
γfxout
γ+fxout−1dx = γfout logfout
γ+fr−1out −1
γ provides a good
estimate of the number of push digests that are sent on average,
thus r ≥ logfout
(
γfout
m
γfout − γ + 1
)
+ 1 provides a good
estimate of the number of rounds needed.
The number of rounds required depends on the number of
random digests, which in turn depends on the number of peers
to infect and the probability of imperfect dissemination pe ≤
n
(
1− 1n
)m
. Note that our analysis is conservative since it
assumes that a peer can send the fout digests to the same peer,
including itself. A more precise analysis with extensions of the
coupon collector’s problem is possible, but does not improve
the results for the networks we consider.
